LayoutHoney
First Considerations
I suppose his layout was a honeywall (just iptables with data-limit, possibly no sebek) and one or more machines behind it running manhunt or honeyd or VMWare.

The honeynet seems made of 24 hosts.

Maybe a box (the 11.11.11.67) with honeyd, and maybe VmWare too, or with some other kind of emulated systems.
Why ?
1st, for he simply has TOO MANY machines in that 11.11.11.! I can't believe they are all real;
2nd, read also the chat logs at SrcDstPort137 in this regard. (ARPD)



How Data Limit Works
(22:09:10) Brennan: i just did a cat | grep "attempt"
(22:09:23) Brennan: only 45
(22:09:40) Brennan: but the rule is definitely "Drop (..) after 13 attempts"
(22:10:08) DANIELE: outbound you mean ? as data limit ? can weel be
(22:10:10) Brennan: oh, no
(22:10:18) Brennan: there are Drop after 20
(22:10:25) Brennan: TCP is after 13 and UDP is 20
(22:11:11) Brennan: that's all .. there are only 45 log entries for "attempt"
(22:11:20) Brennan: and there are 38 for "after 13"
(22:11:25) Brennan: and 7 for "after 20"

Chek also 11.11.11.67 about Data Limit

--------

(22:11:47) Brennan: we should pull out all his custom tags
(22:11:56) Brennan: catalog them
(22:12:15) Brennan: so we have a sort of version of what we think his iptables file looks
(22:12:26) DANIELE: can be done. is a good idea.
(22:12:41) Brennan: and note when changes are made to it, as we have found they changed for INBLOCK


Note: this has also been addressed by BESA in creating the modified logsnorter.

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(23:57:34) Dani3l3: i think there is a simple router in front of it
(23:57:50) Dani3l3: maybe in the 22.22.22 net (that of the dns ?) on the other side of the router ?
(23:57:58) Dani3l3: and then....
(23:58:05) Dani3l3: how can we figure out the topology ?
(23:58:11) Dani3l3: "exits" on the internet ?
(23:58:16) Dani3l3: or maybe they are public addresses
(23:58:34) Dani3l3: but they have been changed into 11.11.11 and 22.22.22 to protect anonimity of the place
(23:58:39) Dani3l3: and they were globally routable
(23:58:42) Brennan: could be
(23:58:57) Brennan: do we think this is web traffic then ? from 11.11.11.x network
(23:59:20) Brennan: then there should be DNS traces on it to those servers also
(00:00:16) Dani3l3: FROM 22.22.22. ?
(00:00:18) Dani3l3: no is the provider
(00:00:28) Dani3l3: then the WERE all globally routable addresses
(00:00:41) Dani3l3: just masked now, sanitized
(00:00:52) BESA: probably using ANONLOG (http://anonlog.sourceforge.net/) or something like that...

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There are entries in the logs from source 127.0.0.1
They are interesting (thus mentioned here) since they made us think of the layout of the network, firewall configuration (anti-spoofing protection or not).

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BESA: I think that it's important to specify the honeywall interfaces.
ETH0 is the external interface;
ETH1 is the internal one.

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Honey Pots (To Be Reviewed)

Dani@NL: These machines send TCP Resets packets outbound, so they are 'alive'.
Moreover, we can check WHAT THEY DENY - that shows that a certain service is not running!
see also TcpResets
idea coming out of TcpFlags too

RST PACKETS:
$ cat honeynet.log |grep 'OUTG CON' |grep 'RST' >OutgRST.log
$ ruby parse.rb OutgRST.log >OutgRST.txt

UNIQ SRC: 3
[UNITED STATES] 11.11.11.71 (46)
[UNITED STATES] 11.11.11.80 (19)
[UNITED STATES] 11.11.11.75 (1)

SRC PORT DATA Totals: (The reset was sent FROM this port, so this service is NOT running - right ?)
[80] 65 - DstPort80
[443] 1 - DstPort443


Which service on which honeypot is NOT running ?

$ cat OutgRST.log |grep "11.11.11.71" >RST.71.log
$ cat OutgRST.log |grep "11.11.11.80" >RST.80.log
$ cat OutgRST.log |grep "11.11.11.75" >RST.75.log
$ ruby parse.rb RST.71.log >RST.71.txt
$ ruby parse.rb RST.80.log >RST.80.txt
$ ruby parse.rb RST.75.log >RST.75.txt


Negative Identification:
11.11.11.71
11.11.11.75
11.11.11.80


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SYN PACKETS:
As we observ them, these machines are instead sending SYN packets outside. SO they INITIATE some sort of connection to the outside world. We have identified a few as legitimate traffic (identd for example - DstPort113). The outhers are often compromises - Question7
UNIQ SRC: 7
[UNITED STATES] 11.11.11.67 (358)
[UNITED STATES] 11.11.11.73 (10)
[UNITED STATES] 11.11.11.72 (10)
[UNITED STATES] 11.11.11.80 (10)
[UNITED STATES] 11.11.11.69 (10)
[UNITED STATES] 11.11.11.75 (10)
[UNITED STATES] 11.11.11.71 (9)

DST PORT DATA: (The port that the honeypot tries to contact on the remote computer)
[113] 375 - DstPort113 - identd
[80] 33 - DstPort80
[21] 6 - DstPort21
[1051] 1 - DstPort1051
[1291] 1
[3184] 1 - DstPort3184



HARDWARE IDENTIFIED BY MAC ADDRESS
The only MAC address found on the log is this:
00:b0:d0:87:85:c3:08:00
Using this service:
we can discover that there's one DELL NIC on the honeynet:

MAC address
   
Prefix Vendor
   
00B0D0 Dell Computer Corp (was: Computer Products International)




CLASSIFICATION:
Honeypots:
They are presented in groups (60's, 70's, 80's host IDs and so on):
11.11.11.64
11.11.11.65 - Syslog Server
11.11.11.67 - Windows Box - we also spot the blocking mechanism of the honeywall talking of this host somewhere in the text (12381 packets)
11.11.11.69 - FTP

11.11.11.70
11.11.11.71 - FTP no web (11062 packets)
11.11.11.72 - FTP
11.11.11.73 - Webserver
11.11.11.75 - Webserver (30130 packets Most attacked machine)

11.11.11.80 - FTP no web (13255 packets)
11.11.11.81
11.11.11.82
11.11.11.83 - NOT ACTIVE - read Microsoft
11.11.11.84
11.11.11.85
11.11.11.87 (10994 packets)
11.11.11.89

11.11.11.90 - Webserver (?) Need to CHECK this one properly (11359 packets)
11.11.11.95

11.11.11.100 (11417 packets)
11.11.11.105 (10915 packets)
11.11.11.110 (10839 packets)
11.11.11.115 (10842 packets)
11.11.11.120
11.11.11.125

Is possible that the honeypots on a same group/range was a different machine with multiple IPs, running virtualized, most of them. (VMWare and/or honeyd at least of commercial honeypot products such as Symantec Decoy Server)



DNS Servers:
22.22.22.40
23.23.23.60


How Should It Look Like



External Reference
Honeynet rc.firewall - http://www.honeynet.org/tools/dcontrol/rc.firewall

Chuvakin in this case runs a modified version of the script, but still we can find some common patterns.

Also in the following document we have a description of a honeynet by Chuvakin (it might of course be changed since then, but it is well worth a good read (!):